The potential intervention of a NATO member's armed forces in Ukraine
The fall of Avdiivka in the Donetsk region of Eastern Ukraine, caused in large part by the Ukrainians running out of artillery ammunition1 is an ominous sign of what may come in the Ukraine War.
The lack of artillery ammunition is a direct result of Republican opposition to Ukraine aid in the U.S. House of Representatives.
Ronald Brownstein in a prescient article in The Atlantic2 points out that even the 22 Republican votes that enabled passage of a compromise bill providing Ukraine aid came mostly from Senators over the age of 55, whereas younger and more recently-elected senators opposed the aid bill.3 This split, Brownstein reports, reflects growing isolationism in a Republican Party which is increasingly under the sway of Donald Trump.
The fall of Avdiivka also reflects an enormous strategic failure on the part of Joe Biden, the U.S., NATO countries, and other countries in the West. That failure has been a basic inability to grasp the full significance of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, including the ultimate stakes in the conflict and the likelihood that the war may last for many years.
This failure has led to a kind of war myopia, where leaders in the West have assumed that a negotiated settlement could be reached in the relatively short term, and that consequently there was no urgent need to shift to a war economy in order to guarantee the production of weapons and other munitions to sustain Ukraine’s war of self-defense over the longer term.
A major consequence of this failure has been that Ukraine does not at present have sufficient munitions–particularly artillery shells–to successfully prosecute the war. The situation is so dire that a collapse of certain sections of the front line cannot be ruled out.4
There are of course a number of other factors which have led Ukraine and the West to be in the current situation.5
Graeme Wood, also in The Atlantic, provides excellent insights into how well life seems to be going in Russia6 Despite the international sanctions that have been adopted. and the fact that Vladimir Putin has moved the country to a war economy where factories are working 24/7 and turning out weapons and ammunition at an impressive rate, life in Russia for the average citizen seems surprisingly good.
Russia is on a war footing and apparently in a position to fight a long war in Ukraine, while NATO and other countries have failed to supply sufficient weapons and ammunition to Ukraine to maintain its recent level of activity against the Russians. Air defense systems like the Patriot Missile batteries will reportedly begin to run out of missiles soon, leaving Ukrainian cities unprotected against Russian missile attacks.
The strategy of Joe Biden and the NATO countries has been a strategy to avoid defeat but not one to ensure victory, as we have pointed out on multiple occasions. For example, the U.S. and its allies have prohibited the use of weapons they supply against targets in Russia.
This makes no military sense, and can only be understood as the product of Joe Biden’s exaggerated fears of Vladimir Putin’s nuclear threats.
Up until now, the U.S. and its NATO allies have only tried to muddle through, helping Ukraine to avoid defeat. They have by and large failed to grasp the implications of a modern industrialized country like Russia adopting a policy of militarism and aggression, in a frontal challenge to the existing U.N.-Charter-based international legal order.
Two years on in the current phase of the war, they haven’t grasped the implications of Russia’s all-out attempt to overthrow the international legal order.
Suddenly, the militarization of space may be openly pursued, as Russia rejects in fact if not formally all existing multilateral treaties prohibiting such military activities.
The collapse of the international legal order may come the same way Ernest Hemingway described in The Sun Also Rises how bankruptcy comes:
“How did you go bankrupt?” Bill asked.
“Two ways,” Mike said. “Gradually and then suddenly.”
A likely consequence of Republican opposition to further military and economic aid for Ukraine will be to accelerate the timetable for what was always implicit in Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine:
The possible entry of NATO forces, or the forces of NATO countries, directly into the conflict.
The “Spectator War” could never be expected to go on forever,
With Russia’s manpower pool more than three times greater than that of Ukraine, it was always evident that Ukraine might run out of soldiers more quickly than Russia. In a war of attrition the manpower advantage would become increasingly important. Russia always had the advantage in this regard.
It also had the advantage of being a nuclear superpower.
With Russia’s industrial base, it was always apparent that on a wartime footing it could produce more munitions than Ukraine, and that if support from Ukraine’s allies ever faltered, a major advantage would pass to Russia.
Yet the stakes in the Ukraine war, not only for Ukraine but for the entire world, are simply too high for the U.S. and NATO countries to accept a Russian victory and annexation of Ukrainian territory acquired by military conquest.
Consequently, if the situation becomes dire and Ukrainian defeat threatens, one or more NATO countries could move their armed forces into Ukraine.
Should Russia then attack the territory of the dispatching state, Article 5 of the NATO Treaty would come into play. Under Article 5, all NATO members are required to come to the assistance of a member state which has been the victim of an armed attack.
Russia could not argue it was acting in self-defense because it is engaged in a war of aggression, Article 5 would consequently be applicable.
After that, who knows how events might develop?
James Rowles is a former Lecturer on Law at Harvard Law School and professor of international law at other universities.
Julian E. Barnes, Thomas Gibbons-Neff, and Eric Schmitt, “Hundreds of Ukrainian Troops Feared Captured or Missing in Chaotic Retreat; The fall of Avdiivka to Russia may be more significant than it initially seemed as Ukraine struggles with morale and recruitment, New York Times, February 20, 2024(5:20 pm ET).
Ronald Brownstein, “The GOP Has Crossed an Ominous Threshold on Foreign Policy; A new study of Republican attitudes helps explain why,” The Atlantic, February 18, 2024 (10:12 am ET).
Brownstein quotes Republican Senator Eric Schmitt as follows:
Soon after the bill passed, first-term Republican Senator Eric Schmitt of Missouri noted a stark generational contrast in the vote. “Nearly every Republican Senator under the age of 55 voted NO on this America Last bill,” Schmitt posted on social media. “15 out of 17 elected since 2018 voted NO. Things are changing just not fast enough.”
See generally, Anthony Loyd, “Ukraine cannot win without a bigger army; Western arms and money are vital but it will take more manpower to resist a revived Russia,” The Times, February 20 2024 (9.00pm).
See, e.g., James Rowles, “Gloomy outlook for war of attrition; Current U.S. and NATO strategy, as well as probable Biden loss in 2024, point toward Ukrainian defeat,” Trenchant Observations, December 5, 2023.
Graeme Wood, “What Tucker Carlson Saw in Moscow; He never quite says what precisely he thinks Russia gets right,” The Atlantic, February 18, 2024;
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