NATO Policy on Transfer to Ukraine of Armored Vehicles and Battle Tanks is Changing, as Putin's Nuclear Threats Lose Credibility
Part One
January 14: NATO policy on transfer of modern armored vehicles changes, as Putin’s nuclear threats lose credibility
Adapted from The Trenchant Observer, January 14, 2023
In the last 10 days we havw witnessed a sea change U.S. and NATO strategy for
assisting Ukraine in its war of self-defense against Russian aggression and the barbarism of its soldiers and military command. The latter have followed a systematic campaign of war crimes amounting to crimes against humanity and apparent genocide.
Vladimir Putin and his accomplices have clearly committed the international crime of aggression, for which the leading Nazi war criminals were condemned to death by hanging at the Nuremberg Trials in 1946. (At Nuremberg “the crime of aggression” was prosecuted under the rubric of “crimes against peace”.)
The allied change in policy, which allows the transfer to Ukraine of armored personnel carriers, infantry fighting vehicles, and reconnaissance tanks, has been an extremely long time in coming. It apparently reflects a new assessment of the risk represented by Putin’s frequent nuclear threats, which have been losing credibility.
Marc Bassets and Elena G. Sevillano of El País have done a masterful job in pulling together the different threads of this story, and presenting in a single article a succinct and cogent account of recent developments and what they mean1
We have reported on various aspects of these developments here2 and in The Trenchant Observer blog.
Long in coming, the change in policy has breathtaking implications.
There is no longer any strong argument for not giving Ukraine the battle tanks it has long been requesting. There are a large number of German-built Leopard 2 battle tanks available in Germany and in different NATO countries in Europe. The Leopard 2’s require less fuel than the American Abrams tanks, while maintenance and repair facilities in Europe are numerous and closer to Ukraine than U.S. facilities.
The Leopard 2’s would make a huge difference on the battlefield as Ukraine launches further counter-offensives to to take back Ukrainian territory “temporarily occupied by Russia”, as the Ukrainians put it.
We should ignore all the confused arguments about whether the Leopard’s are “offensive” or “defensive”. Ukraine is defending itself against a Russian military invasion. All weapons furnished to Ukraine to help it repel the Russian attack and to expel Russian troops from Ukrainian territory (including the Crimea), in exercise of its right of self-defense under international law and Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, are “defensive” in character.
It is not the inherent characteristics of a weapon that determine whether it is “offensive” or “defensive”, but rather its use. Here all weapons transferred to Ukraine are for the exercise of its right to self-defense under international law, and are therefore “defensive”.
The White House and NATO partners seem to have adopted or to be moving toward a strategy that recognizes there will not be any negotiated ceasefire or settlement of the conflict, and that the war is likely to continue for a long time.
Given these realities, they seem to increasingly recognize that a strategy of “avoiding defeat” will not address the Russian challenge to Ukraine, and to European and international security.
Part Two
January 15, 2023: Will NATO countries commit fully to “victory”, and go all out to help Ukraine win the war?
Adapted from The Trenchant Observer, January 15, 2023
The latest news reports from Europe indicate that German Chancellor Olaf Scholz is on the verge of ceding to the demands of NATO partners Poland and the U.K., and future NATO partner Finland, to grant authorization for countries willing to transfer German-made Leopard 2 battle tanks to Ukraine.3
If this occurs it will be a major breakthrough in terms of the conceptual hurdles blocking such transfers.
Even if Germany grants such authorizations, however, a huge question remaining will be whether Germany will itself transfer Leopard 2 battle tanks to Ukraine from its own stocks. Estimates are that Germany has some 200 Leopard 2’s in storage which it could send to Ukraine after they have been made “battle ready”. The manufacturer says this process could take a year.
German Defense Minister Christine Lambrecht (SPD) has announced that she will resign.4 She has been harshly criticized for the slow and incompetent manner in which she has responded to weapons requests from Ukraine, even after the Scholz government has promised the weapons. But as Klaus Geiger points out5 she has actually been carrying out the dilatory and wavering policies of Chancellor Olaf Scholz, who retains firm control over such decisions.
Scholz appears to be the only European leader who is even more afraid of Vladimir Putin and his nuclear threats than is President Joe Biden. In Scholz’s case, however, more than fear seems to be influuencing his decisions. Scholz is the head of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) as well as that of the governing “traffic light coalition” (SPD, Green Party, FDP). The SDP harbors within its ranks a large number of “those who understand Putin” (Putin Versteher) and even pro-Russian members. Scholz seems to be performing a balancing act trying to satisfy both these elements and other elements within the party and the coalition who favor greater military support for Ukraine.
Despite the commitment of the U.K. to send battle tanks to Ukraine, and Scholz apparently moving toward authorization of sending Leopard 2 battle tanks to Ukraine, two overarching questions remain:
The first question is whether Biden, Scholz, and other NATO and coalition partners will commit fully to the goal of victory, in the Ukrainian sense.
That would include:
1) Withdrawal of Russian forces from all Ukrainian territory;
2) Payment of war reparations by Russia for the damages to life and property it has caused by its war of aggression; and
3) Trial of Russian officials and soldiers for war crimes they have committed in launching and conducting a war of aggression against Ukraine.
All of these elements are consistent with international law. The first element is required by peremptory norms of international law (jus cogens).
“Total victory” in the Ukrainian sense does not mean “unconditional surrender” as was the case with Germany and Japan in World War II.
The second question is whether Biden, Scholz, and other key NATO and coalition partners will go all out to help Ukraine win the war and uphold international law and the U.N. Charter.
A positive answer to this question would mean that the U.S. and its allies will move quickly toward a war footing, for example, by ramping up manufacture and delivery of weapons and other munitions to emergency wartime levels such as we saw in World War II.
It would also mean pressing countries in the “Global South” to condemn Russian aggression and barbarism in Ukraine, and to join the international sanctions regime aimed at bringing both to an early halt.
Further, it would mean strengthening current sanctions, e.g., by banning the import to the EU of oil transported by pipeline (over land)—with whatever exception may be required for Hungary. Germany is currently benefitting from an exception from the EU oil import ban, for oil transported by land (e.g., pipeline).
Finally, it would mean playing hardball with Turkey—which is blocking the accession of Sweden to NATO—by beginning studies of how American air bases might be transferred to other NATO countries such as Greece, re-examining U.S. military sales and assistance to Turkey, and exploring options for expelling Turkey from NATO.
The responses to both these questions should reveal a realization that victory in the war in Ukraine is essential to ensure the future freedom and security of NATO and other countries. The cost of military and other aid to Ukraine should be considered in this light, e.g., as a percentage of each country’s national and military budgets.
Only if the West sets victory as its goal will Ukraine have a realistic chance of winning its war, which is also our war.6
It is a war not only to defend Ukraine but also to uphold international law, the U.N. Charter, and our civilization which is based on reason and law, not barbarism and military conquest.7
See,
1) Marc Bassets y Elena G. Sevillano, “Francia, Alemania y Estados Unidos aceleran su apoyo bélico a Ucrania con el envío de tanques modernos; Kiev obtiene por primera vez blindados de fabricación occidental tras meses de reticencias en París y Berlín,” El País, el 6 de enero 2023 (23:49 EST);
2) Marc Bassets and Elena G. Sevillano, “France, Germany and the United States accelerate their military support for Ukraine with the shipment of modern tanks; Kiev gets Western-made armored vehicles for the first time after months of reluctance in Paris and Berlin, El País, January 6, 2023 (23:49 EST).
“The West’s goals in the Ukraine war: Avoiding defeat or achieving victory?” Trenchant Observations, January 12, 2023.
See,
1) Cécile Boutelet(Berlin, correspondance), Cécile Ducourtieux(Londres, correspondante) et Cédric Pietralunga, “Guerre en Ukraine : les Européens promettent de premiers chars à Kiev; Après la Finlande et la Pologne, le Royaume-Uni a annoncé, samedi, la livraison « dans les prochaines semaines » de quatorze Challenger 2. Les pressions sur l’Allemagne, qui s’y était toujours refusée, sont en voie de faire céder le chancelier,” Le Monde, le 16 janvier 2023 (mis à jour à 05h03);
2) Cécile Boutelet (Berlin, correspondent), Cécile Ducourtieux (London, correspondent), and Cédric Pietralunga, “War in Ukraine: Europeans promise first tanks in Kiev; After Finland and Poland, the United Kingdom announced on Saturday the delivery “in the coming weeks” of fourteen Challenger 2 tanks. Pressure on Germany, which had always refused, is on the way to making the Chancellor ccede,” Le Monde, January 16, 2023 (updated at 5:03 a.m.).
Kate Connolly (Berlin), “German defence minister Christine Lambrecht quits after series of blunders,” The Guardian, January 16, 2023 (11:10 GMT).
Klaus Geiger, “Lambrechts Schwäche war für Olaf Scholz ein Geschenk,” Die Welt, den 15. Januar 2023;
See,
Phillips Payson O’Brien, ,”Time Is on Ukraine’s Side, Not Russia’s; The Ukrainians will win if they keep getting better weapons,” The Atlantic, January 14, 2023 (8:00 a.m. ET).
Phillips Payson O’Brien is a professor of strategic studies at the University of St. Andrews in Scotland. He is the author of How the War Was Won: Air-Sea Power and Allied Victory in World War II.;
See,
“The real stakes in Ukraine: Freedom and a world ruled by reason and law, not force and barbarism,” Trenchant Observations, November 3, 2022.
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See also “Why I care about the war in Ukraine,” Trenchant Observations, June 26, 2022.