Biden's fear of Putin and Putin's fear of NATO

Doctor of Juridical Science (SJD) in International Law, Harvard University

Adapted from The Trenchant Observer, June 20, 2023,

We and others have commented at length about Joe Biden’s fear of Putin and his nuclear threats.¹

But there has been little commentary on Vladimirv Putin’s fear of NATO.

From an objective point of view, Putin has much greater reason to fear NATO and NATO forces than Biden has to fear Putin and Russian forces.

These fears are based on realities, particulaely with respect to engaging NATO forces in direct combat, or doing something stupid like using chemical weapons or detonating a tactical nuclear warhead in Ukraine.

It is in this light that recent statements from Russian officials must be viewed.

Andrew Roth of The Guardian reports,²

Russia has threatened a strike against Kyiv’s “decision-making centres” if Ukraine uses western-supplied missiles against the occupied peninsula of Crimea, in the Kremlin’s latest attempt to inhibit Nato support for Kyiv amid the ongoing Ukrainian counteroffensive.

Sergei Shoigu, the Russian defence minister, said on Tuesday that the potential use of US-supplied Himars and UK-supplied Storm Shadow missiles against targets in Crimea would mark the west’s “full involvement in the conflict and would entail immediate strikes upon decision-making centres in Ukrainian territory”. Those are seen to include the Ukrainian presidential administration and intelligence headquarters.

This is a bizarre war, in which Russia seeks to dictate what weapons can or cannot be used by Ukraine in exercise of its right of self-defense under international law and the U.N. Charter.

Biden and NATO have generally reacted passively to these and similar threats.

The proper response to Russian General Shoigu’s threats would be:

1) to reaffirm Ukraine’s right of self-defense against Russia’s ongoing illegal invasion of the country. This right encompasses the right to strike military targets and decision centers in Russia which are supporting the invasion by various means including missile and drone attacks against Ukrainian cities and other targets. The right of self-defense also encompasses the right to shoot down aircraft from which missiles are being launched against Ukraine, regardless of whether they are over Russian territory or the Black Sea. Ukraine may also lawfully exercise its right of self-defense by attacking ships firing missiles or launching drones against targets in Ukraine, no matter where they are located.

2) to reaffirm the right of the United States and other countries, including NATO countries, to assist Ukraine in defending its territory in exercise of the inherent right of collective self-defense guaranteed by Article 51 of the U.N. Charter.

This includes the right to furnish Ukraine with weapons to use against targets in Russia in exercise of the right of individual and collective self-defense.

It also includes the right of other countries, including NATO countries, to directly strike targets in Russia with their own military forces, in exercise of their right of collective self-defense.

Significantly, nations acting in collective self-defense may undertake all of the self-defensive measures to which Ukraine is entitled. Even where Ukraine lacks the capability to fully exercise its right of self-defense, other countries such as NATO countries may do so with their own forces.

That means that Russian ships in the Caspian Sea or the Mediterranean from which missiles are being fired at Ukraine would be legitimate targets for the armed forces of NATO and other countries coming to the assistance of Ukraine in exercise of their right of collective self-defense.

The U.S. and other NATO countries should in any event relax the restrictions on the use of weapons transferred to Ukraine against military targets in Russia, from which attacks on Ukrainian cities and other targets are being launched and supported.

In response to Shoigu’s threats, NATO countries including the U.S. should state publicly that if Russia carries out Shoigu’s threats, they will relax any restrictions on arms transfers to Ukraine that restrict that country’s exercise of its right of self-defense under international law and the U.N. Charter–-with immediate effect.

That means that—with immediate effect—Ukraine could use those weapons to strike targets in Russia.

There appears to be nothing Putin fears more than the direct engagement of NATO forces against the Russian military, which would be in exercise of the NATO countries’ right of collective self-defense under international law and the U.N. Charter.

Putin could detonate a tactical nuclear weapon in Ukraine at some point of desperation. The U.S. and other NATO countries should make clear to him and the Russian public what could happen then, describing a broad range of options and their potential effects.

This the U.S. and NATO countries have probably already done in private. Given the wild nuclear talk on Russian state-controlled media, it would be useful to publicly detail these options and their likely consequences–in a cool and level-headed manner.

One action they might take would be for one or more NATO countries to station troops in Ukraine, initially in a passive, non-combative posture.

A second option would be for NATO to take out the Russian forces in Ukraine.

Putin and Russia would then be directly engaged with NATO forces, the one thing Putin–and certainly his generals–probably want most to avoid.

It is time to focus on Putin’s fears of NATO. His “red lines” have been repeatedly crossed by Ukraine and the West, producing no significant responses. They have been mostly bluffs.

Putin needs to understand now, whatever his experience with Joe Biden may have been in the past, that his nuclear threats lack credibility among many NATO members. Moreover. Biden is not the only one making military decisions for the West, as Britain’s supply of Storm Shadow long-range missiles to Ukraine so clearly demonstrates.

Shoigu’s threats represent a recognition by Russian military leaders of the extreme vulnerability of their forces, especially in the Crimea, to the British Storm Shadow long-range missiles and the American long-range ATACMS artillery rockets launched by HIMARS artillery units.

If anything, this admission of vulnerability by Russian military leaders should spur Joe Biden on to give the “green light” everyone has been awaiting for the use of the long-range ATACMS artillery rockets.

Putin’s fears of NATO should be growing. Indeed, given the disparate capabilities of his forces and those of NATO, he should be quaking in his boots.

The carefully calibrated threats of Shoigu suggest that his fears of NATO are also great. He was quite careful, for example, to state that only targets within Ukraine would be attacked–and clearly not any target in a NATO country.

The U.S. and NATO should take actions designed to increase the fears of Putin, the Russian military, and the Russian public, thereby increasing deterrence against any foolish actions on Russia’s part.

1. See, e.g., “Are Putin's nuclear threats working? Will Biden blink?” Trenchant Observations, October 8, 2022.

2. Andrew Roth, “Russia threatens Ukraine’s ‘decision-making centres’ if Kyiv uses western arms in Crimea; Use of US- and UK-supplied missiles would mark west’s ‘full involvement’, Russian defence minister says,’ The Guardian, June 20, 2023 (17.26 BST).

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See also “Why I care about the war in Ukraine,” Trenchant Observations, June 26, 2023.