Eight great illusions about the war in Ukraine: Where we stand now

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Eight Great Illusions

On July 13, 2022, we wrote about “Eight great illusions about the war in Ukraine" and ‘Cognitive occlusion.’"

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On August 20, 2022, we wrote “Eight great illusions about the war in Ukraine: Assessment of their continuing strength today.”

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Now Vladimir Putin has ordered a “partial” mobilization of troops, “annexed” four new provinces (in addition to the Crimea which was “annexed” after its military conquest in 2014), and brandished new and more earnest nuclear threats.

At such a juncture, it is useful to take a look at the current status of these eight great illusions and where we stand today. Such an analysis will help point the way toward what we should be doing now, if we are to prevail in the current civilizational struggle against Vladimir Putin and Putin’s Russia.

The eight great illusions are:

(1) The war is a skirmish, not an existential struggle for the survival of our civilization, including the U.N. Charter, international law and human rights.

(2) Economic sanctions will persuade Russia to end the war.

(3) NATO and the West can avoid becoming directly engaged militarily.

(4) Settlement on Putin’s terms with terrirorial “concessions”—appeasement—is a viable possibility.

(5) The war can continue in the Ukraine without massive global upheavals, and in a few years the world will continue much as it was before.

(6) A nuclear showdown can be avoided.

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(7) The West can win the war against Putin without the support of “the South”.

(8) The war can continue, in the Ukraine, without posing an extraordinary risk of a widespread conflagration short of nuclear war.

Current Status and Strength of the Eight Great Illusions

As on August 20, it is fitting and timely to ask, what is the status and strength of these illusions today? Has any progress been made in facing reality? Let us analyze them one by one.

1) The war is a skirmish, not an existential struggle for the survival of our civilization, including the U.N. Charter, international law and human rights.

One can hardly term an imminent nuclear confrontation between NATO and Russia a “skirmish”. NATO and EU countries and other members of the coalition supporting Ukraine are engaged in a near all-out economic war against Russia, and are furnishing Ukraine with weapons and ammunition, including increasingly sophisticated weapons and defense systems, to enable Ukraine to defeat the Russian army and force the withdrawal of Russian troops.

The anti-Russian coalition is already involved in a war against Russia in every way except direct military engagement with Russian forces. They need to admit the fact that they are engaged in a civilizational struggle, just like the struggle against Germany in World War II.

They shrink from admitting that fact, based on the notion that they do not want to become a party to or a belligerent in the war.

This position is based on a mistaken understanding of contemporary internation law. Since the adoption of the U.N. Charter in 1945, the concept of being a “belligerent” or a party to a war no longer exists, except in the very limited context of international humanitarian law and the Geneva Conventions dealing with the protection of civilians and prisoners of war.

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NATO and other countries providing military assistance to Ukraine are exercising their inherent right of collective self-defense under international law and in accordance with Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. This is the way contemporary international law and the U.N. Charter frame the issue.

It is important that countries supporting Ukraine understand and clearly articulate these issues in the terms of contemporary international law. Providing any weapon to Ukraine for its self-defense, even those capable of attacking targets in Russia proper, does not make a country a party to the war or in general terms a “belligerent” in the conflict. They need to explain this to Putin and Russia, over and over and again and again.

In everyday terms, the countries in the Ukraine coalition are engaged in a war of self-defense against Russia whose aim is to repel the Russian aggression and secure the withdrawal of Russian troops from Ukraine.

In legal terms, they are engaged in the exercise of the inherent right of collective self-defense under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter in response to an “armed attack” by Russia against Ukraine in violation of the prohibition of the use of force contained in Article 2 paragraph 4 of the U.N. Charter.

Despite these overwhelming facts, this illusion seems to be holding strong among many individuals including officials.

(2) Economic sanctions will persuade Russia to end the war.

Economic sanctions may contribute to a great contraction of the Russian economy, but our experience with Cuba, North Korea, and Iran suggests they will not in and by themselves bring about the replacement of Putin or an end to the war, which now amount to the same thing.

While current economic sanctions will not end the war, the introduction of secondary sanctions against Russia could conceivably hasten the day when Putin is replaced, which could then potentially lead to an end to the conflict.

(3) NATO and the West can avoid becoming directly engaged militarily.

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If Putin uses a nuclear weapon, even a tactical nuclear weapon, NATO is likely to become directly involved in the conflict militarily. NATO countries are already involved in providing military assistance, including intelligence information and advice on strategy.

(4) Settlement on Putin’s terms with terrirorial “concessions”—appeasement—is a viable possibility.

Ukrainian leaders have absolutely ruled out the possibility of any “territorial concessions” as part of a ceasefire or peace settlement. Most EU and NATO countries plus the G-7 have now also ruled out this possibility. This “option” would be contrary to peremptory or mandatory norms of international law (jus cogens) from which there can be no exception, not even by agreement. For this reason, “territorial concessions” were never a realistic option for a ceasefire or settlement.

Putin’s “annexation” of four new provinces plus his 2014 “annexation” of the Crimea further eliminate a settlement based on “territorial concessions”. From Putin’s point of view, the only thing Ukraine could concede would be its recognition of his “annexation”. Such a “concession”, however, would be void under international law and have no legal effect.

(5) The war can continue in the Ukraine without massive global upheavals, and in a few years the world will continue much as it was before.

We are just beginning to see the massive global upheavals which the war is causing. For the moment the grain shipment agreement brokered by Turkey and the United Nations has eased the blockade of Ukrainian ports, and eased the food shortage and price increases which were expected to cause famine in certain countries of Africa and the Middle East. However, the agreement is set to expire in November, and it is far from clear whether Russia will authorize its extension.

Air travel to Russia has been greatly curtailed. Hundreds of thousands of Russian men are fleeing Russia to avoid being drafted and sent to Ukraine.

The war has contributed to inflation around the world, which is influencing changes in government.

With no end of the war in sight, there appears to be little chance that within a few year the world will continue much as it was before.

(6) A nuclear showdown can be avoided.

We currently face an extremely grave risk of a nuclear showdown between Russia and the U.S. and its NATO partners. Most analysts agree that this risk is far greater than it has ever been since the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis.

See Illusion (3) above and footnote 5.

(7) The West can win the war against Putin without the support of “the South”.

Prospects are for a long war in Ukraine. While there appears to be some movement toward condemning the Russian invasion of Ukraine in the countries of “the South”, there is little evidence of them being willing to join the sanctions regime against Russia.

In the U.N. Security Council meeting on September 30, 2022, India, Brazil, and Gabon, in addition to China, abstained in voting on a draft resolution condemning Russia. Only Russia voted against the draft resolution, which was defeated 10-1-4 due to the Russian veto.

Worth noting is that the countries which abstained or voted against the resolution are four of the so-called BRICS countries. South Africa, which seeks to remain neutral on Ukraine, is the fifth. The tterm was originally coined by a New York investment firm receommending investments in large emerging economies. The countries have taken on the moniker as their own, and now hold annual summits. Their new loyalties appear to outweigh their dedication to the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.

This week we may see further evidence of tbe extent to which countries in “the South” are willing to condemn Russia and stand up in defense of the fundamental principles and norms of the U.N. Charter, as the draft resolution is taken up in the U.N. General Assembly.

There has been no apparent change in the U.S. policy of not pressuring countries in “the South” to condemn Russian aggression and war crimes in Ukraine, or to join the sanctions regime.

This illusion appears to be holding strong.

(8) The war can continue, in the Ukraine, without posing an extraordinary risk of a widespread conflagration short of nuclear war.

Putin has very earnestly threatened the use of nuclear weapons. He could use a tactical nuclear weapon, for example, if the Russian army in Ukraine faced imminent collapse, or if the 20,000 Russian troops west of the Dnieper or Dnipo River were to face a situation in which they had to choose between immediate surrender or annihilation.

If NATO responded militarily to the use of a nuclear weapon, even conventionally, the likelihood of the conflict extending far beyond Ukraine would increase dramatically.

Already we have seen the extension of the conflict to the North Sea with the sabotage, apparently by Russia, of the Nordstream I and II gas pipelines.

Necessary actions suggested by this analysis

On July 25 we offered our suggestions on the steps that needed to be taken to win the war.

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Among the principal recommendations were the following:

1) Allies must set up a unified directorate of military and diplomatic affairs. No more freelancing.

2) NATO countries must release restrictions on the use of long-range weapons, and supply artillery shells with the full range of what artillery pieces are capable of.

3) Broad and all-of-government efforts must be made to gain the support of “the South” for Ukraine and for the sanctions regime. Diplomats forced out of the State Department by Donald Trump and Michael Pompeo should be called back into service for the good of the country.

4) All loopholes in sanctions must be closed.

5) War production in the West must be ramped up to supply Ukraine with the weapons it will need over the long term–five to ten years.

6) NATO must prepare for fighting a conventional war of collective self-defense against Russia, with the strictly limited objective of repelling the Russian “armed attack” against Ukraine in accordance with Article 51 of the U.N. Charter.

All of these recommendations still need to be vigorously implemented. Specifically,

1) Coalition and NATO partners need to make sure there is no more freelancing by individual national leaders like Emmanuel Macron and Olaf Scholz.

2) The White House and NATO need to release to Ukraine long-range weapons like the HIMARS with 180-mile range ammunition, and promptly authorize the supply of fighter jets and battle tanks to Ukraine. The White House should allow these transfers to go forward, while retaining restrictions on their use to attack targets in Russia without prior authorization.

Doing so will provide options in place in the event Russia detonates a tactical nuclear device.

If the Russians keep bombarding Ukrainian cities, the White House and NATO should allow Ukraine to use the HIMARS as permitted by the international law of self-defense, even against bases in Russia from which such attacks are being launched.

Jets and tanks should not be authorized for use in Russia proper, at least not initially and barring escalation by Russia to the use of chemical or nuclear weapons.

3) The U.S. and other coalition countries should pressure countries in “the South” to condemn Russian aggression and war crimes and to join the sanctions regime.

4)Loopholes in the sanctions regime (e.g., German importation of oil through an oil pipeline) should be closed, and the U.S. and the EU should move as quickly as possible toward the adoption of “secondary” economic sanctions against Russia.

5) War production of weapons and other munitions for Ukraine should be ramped up as fast as possible-at World War II speed. The U.S. should pressure Scholz and Germany to immediately transfer the battle tanks and armored personnel carriers it is holding back on the pretext that it doesn’t want to go it alone. NATO countries must make it clear that this is not a valid excuse for not supplying these weapons to Ukraine. Holding back on their delivery is costing Ukrainian lives, every day.

6) Since the likelihood of Putin using a tactical nuclear weapons appears to grow day by day, NATO should take all necessary measures to be prepared to respond quickly, by conventional means, to such a nuclear event. This should be done quietly, but in a manner Putin can see.

Finally, Biden should strengthen his forein policy team by bringing in wise and seasoned officials like Leon Panetta and Bob Gates. We have suggested they form part of a Nuclear Decisions Advisory Group to make it clear to Putin that he is dealing with more than the president and the foreign policy team that withdrew from Afghanistan and that decided to take force off the table in responding to a potential Russian invasion of Ukraine.

For the latest developments, see

1) “Ukraine War, October 3, 2022: Petraeus warns of NATO response to any use of a nuclear weapon; Movement of nuclear warheads toward Western front in Russia,” The Trenchant Observer, October 3, 2022.

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1. “Eight great illusions about the war in Ukraine; ‘Cognitive occlusion,’” Trenchant Observations,July 14, 2022.

2. “Eight great illusions about the war in Ukraine: Assessment of their continuing strength today,” August 20, 2022,

3. The situation is perilous. See “Ukraine War, October 3, 2022: Petraeus warns of NATO response to any use of a nuclear weapon; Movement of nuclear warheads toward Western front in Russia,” The Trenchan Observer, October 3, 2022.

4. See “Ukraine War, May 7, 2022 (I): Speaker of Russian Duma accuses U.S. of direct involvement in military operations against Russia; The meaning of "Belligerent" and being at war with Russia--Confusion between International Humanitarian Law and the Law of the U.N. Charter,” The Trenchant Observer, May 7, 2022.

5. The situation today is perilous. See “Ukraine War, October 3, 2022: Petraeus warns of NATO response to any use of a nuclear weapon; Movement of nuclear warheads toward Western front in Russia,” The Trenchan Observer, October 3, 2022.

6. “Ukraine War, July 25, 2022: To win the war in Ukraine, what must be done?” The Trenchant Observer, July 25, 2022.