Speak to Putin in a language he understands: the language of force

Ukraine and the West are losing the war in Ukraine

Ukraine and the West are losing the war in Ukraine. As the war recedes from the news and the consciousness of citizens in the’ United States, and to a lesser degree even in Europe, the Russian army moves grindingly forward.

Following the fall of the last two major cities in Luhansk province, Russia has set its sights on conquering the remaining portions of Donetsk province which it does not control. It will probably then proceed with renewed attacks on Kharkiv, and at some point its march toward Odesa.

At such a point it is useful to take stock of where we are in the overall battle to defend Ukraine, the U.N. Charter and international law, and our civilization against the Russian barbarian onslaught.

Lluis Bassetts of El País in Spain has reminded us of the fact that the only language Putin seems to understand is the language of force.¹

It is useful also to review the overview of the war strategy of the West published by The Trenchant Observer on March 31, 2022.²

The broader situation: Specifics

Grain shipments

There have been calls for NATO warships to escort ships transporting Ukrainian grain from Odessa, in order to break the Russian blockade of Ukrainian ports and reduce the risk of famine in African and other countries.

The idea seems promising until you take international law considerations into account.

Turkey will not authorize the transit of warships into the Black Sea, which is required under the 1936 Montreux Convention. Under the Convention, Turkey is actually helping Ukraine by blocking passage of additional Russian warships into the Black Sea. If Turkey were to drop its ban for NATO warships, this could weaken the ban on the passage of Russian warships.

The only solution to the blockade that might be possible would appear to be a U.N. sponsored convoy authorized by a Security Council resolution under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. Chapter VII gives the Security Council the authority to take binding enforcement actions to maintain international peace and security.

The Russians could conceivably be prevailed upon by countries from Africa and the Middle East to abstain on the resolution.

Such a resolution could in theory, under Chapter VII, override the Montreux Convention and allow for some kind of military escort to avoid the mines and prevent any attacks. This may be a slender possibility, but there appears to be no other.

Turkey has been trying to broker a deal with Moscow to allow passage of a convoy carrying grain shipments. Even if Russia were to agree, something like the U.N.-authorized convoy would be required to entice ship owners and their insurers to allow ships to pass through the mined waters of the Black Sea.

Unfortunately, it appears that rail shipments won’t get the grain out in time—at least not this year.

Sanctions and their effectiveness

The sanctions are not producing the crippling effects on the Russian economy that had been anticipated, largely due to Russia’s increased revenues from the sale of oil and Europe’s continuing purchases of Russian gas.

German politicians seem more worried about having to ration energy for home heating than they are about the defeats being suffered by Ukrainian forces in the Donbas, and the loss of 100-200 soldiers every day.

One solution for strengthening the sanctions would entail a faster weaning of European countries off Russian gas, and the imposition of an Iran-type oil embargo, including secondary sanctions.

It was disappointing to see Germany piggyback on Hungary’s claim for an exception to the EU’s recent oil embargo so they could keep receiving oil through a pipeline from Russia. The sanction might have been tailored more narrowly to meet Hungary’s particular needs.

The whole idea of price caps for the purchase of Russian oil would seem to be utterly unrealistic, however appealing it may be to a first-year business school student as a theoretical matter.

One bright spot on sanctions: Russian civil aviation may soon be grounded due to the inability to get spare parts.

When push comes to shove: Ukrainian use of weapons limited only by the U.N. Charter and international law

The next major decision point which may come up, if Ukraine over time is losing the war, would be for NATO countries to modify their restrictions on Ukrainian use of the weapons they supply.

The U.S. and NATO countries should simply take the position that Ukraine can only use the weapons it receives in accordance with the U.N. Charter and international law.

Such a change would allow Ukraine to defend itself against Russian rocket attacks launched from bases within Russia.

To be sure, such a change could lead to attacks that would cross Putin’s “red line” of not allowing attacks on Russian territory. Still, the policy would be totally legitimate under the U.N. Charter and international law.

The U.S. and NATO countries could simply state that they are furnishing weapons to Ukraine to be used in exercise of the inherent right of self-defense guaranteed by Article 51 of the U.N. Charter.

Such a change in policy would undoubtedly “provoke” Putin. But if the stakes in the war are as high as they appear, such an indirect confrontation with Russia may become inevitable if we are to prevent a Russian victory in Ukraine.

War and even supporting one side in a war of self-defense, and here the defense of the U.N. Charter and our civilization, is not without risks.

Nor is defeat.

1. Lluís Bassets, “El lenguaje que Putin entiende; Hasta la cumbre de Madrid, los europeos no habían conseguido hablarle al líder ruso con una sola voz y sin vacilaciones en el idioma de la fuerza,” El País, el 01 de julio 2022 (23:40 EDT);

English

Lluís Bassets, “The language that Putin understands; Until the Madrid summit, Europeans had not been able to speak to the Russian leader with one voice and without hesitation in the language of force,” (Google translation from website), El País, el 01 de julio 2022 (11:40 pm);

2. “Ukraine War, March 31, 2022 (II): The war strategy of the West in perspective,” The Trenchant Observer, March 31, 2022;