Intention vs. capability: The flaw in worst-case scenario thinking about Iran
How to get diplomacy back on track after the Israeli and American bombings of Iran
BACKGROUND
1) James Rowles, “Should the U.S. join Israel in bombing Iran? The timing is off, “ Trenchant Observations, June 19, 2025.
2) James Rowles, “[REVISED AND UPDATED] Israel-Iran war: Let us all remember the U.N. Charter and international law--With a link to an authoritative analysis of the legal arguments,” Trenchant Observations, June 28, 2025.
The U.S. bombing of nuclear sites in Iran on Friday, June 20, 2025, halted the U.S.-Iranian negotiations on a nuclear deal, which were reported to be making progress but had already been placed in doubt by the Israeli bombing of Iran which began on June 13.
The U.S. attack violated the most fundamental principle of the United Nations Charter, Article 2 paragraph 4, which prohibits the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.
The attack constituted an act of agression. By launching it, President Trump appears to have committed the international crime of aggression, one of the war crimes for which Nazi war criminals were tried, convicted, and executed at the Nuremberg Trials in 1946.
U.S. military planners and civilian officials made a fundamental error in assessing the nuclear threat from Iran, which formed the underlying basis for the decision to attack the country.
Using the “worst case scenario” assumption common to military planners, they focused on Iran’s capability to build a nuclear weapon, and simply assumed that Iran had the intention to build a bomb and to use it against Israel.
This ignored the fact that the critical variable is not capability to build a bomb and deploy it as a weapon, but rather the intention of the government involved.
Iran has always declared that it has no intention to build a nuclear weapon. A 2003 fatwa by Ayatollah Ali Khamenai prohibited the development of a nuclear weapon. Moreover, Iran is a party to the 1968 United Nations Non-Proliferation zTreaty (NPT) in which parties undertake the commitment not to develop nuclear weapons in exchange for the commitment by the Nuclear Weapons States to assist them in developing nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.
The critical variable here is the intention, not the capability, although the two are clearly related.
To be sure, Iran’s enrichment of over 400 kg of uranium to over 60% enrichment (commercial use requires less than 5% enrichment) raises the possibility that Iran could further enrich the material to 90% uranium, which is what they would need to develop a bomb. That would take an additional period of time.
Enrichment to 60% is susceptible to differing interpretations. On the one hand, it could mean that Iran has decided to build a bomb and is taking the steps necessary to do so. On the other hand it could mean only that Iran is developing its options, here the option to develop and deploy a nuclear weapon in a short period of time.
Even development of a nuclear weapon would be subject to differing interpretations. On the one hand, it could mean Iran intends to use such a nuclear weapon to destroy a major city such as Tel Aviv. On the other hand, Iran could view the development of a nuclear weapon as a means to deter Israel or the United States from any further attacks on its territory, whether to destroy its nuclear facilities or to overthrow the ayatollahs’ regime.
The likelihood of Iran actually attacking Israel with a nuclear weapon, even if it acquires one, is very small. Israel is reported to have over 100 nuclear weapons. To attack Israel with a nuclear weapon would probably mean the total destruction of Iran in a nuclear counter-strike. While Israel is understandably reluctant to have to rely for its security on mutual assured destruction (MAD) with a messianic religious regime in Tehran, such a situation must be weighed against the alternatives.
In the 1980’s countries participated in what was known as the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE) which aimed at developing a consensus among potential nuclear weapons states not to develop nuclear weapons while devising institutional arrangements that would limit the possibilities of doing so.
INFCE was aimed at strengthening intentions not to develop nuclear weapons, while increasing the transparency of all nuclear development activities.
At that time there were perhaps 20 or more countries capable of producing nuclear weapons but which had no intention of doing so (e.g., Japan, West Germany).
The ultimate guarantee of Israeli security from nuclear attack by Iran will be a product of strengthening Iran’s intention not to develop nuclear weapons. The 2015 JCPOA was an important step in this direction.
We need to understand that there will be factions in Iran which favor the development of nuclear weapons, and factions which oppose such development.
A wise strategy will aim at strengthening the second group, and weakening the first.
Unfortunately, the bombing of Iranian nuclear sites since June 13 is likely to have the opposite effect.
Worst-case scenario thinking may be appropriate for military planners. But that is true only if their limited analysis is complemented by a broader analysis by intelligent and experienced civilian superiors.
The big mistake in June, which may have roots that go back decades, has been to focus exclusively on “capability” to the exclusion of “intention.”
A wise policy to restrain Iran’s development of a nuclear weapon would focus on strengthening those who oppose developing a nuclear weapon and weakening those who want to develop one. Each time Israel or the United States bombs Iran strengthens the position of hard-line advocates of developing a bomb.
It also weakens the deterrent force of Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter. Violations of Article 2 (4) by the U.S. Israel and others only add to Iran’s fear of being attacked and its incentive to develop a nuclear weapon.
Israel, moreover, tends to overestimate its ability to achieve its goals, as its long but unsuccessful campaign to completely remove Hamas from Gaza illustrates.
Each attempt to destroy Iran’s nuclear program is likely to strengthen groups in Iran pushing for development of a bomb. Yet the Israeli goal of destroying Iran’s nuclear program may simply be impossible to achieve.
The best approach may be to proceed slowly, snd to seek implementation of a slightly-revised JCPOA with the IAEA monitoring and inspections it envisions.
One important change may be required. Russia is today more of an ally of Iran than a P-5 member of the Security Council interested in stopping nuclear proliferation, and having invaded Ukraine is in a poor position to uphold the fundamental principles of the United Nations Charter,
To increase the likelihood of success of this approach, two parallel courses of action should be undertaken.
First, agreement on sanctions to be imposed on any state that attacks Iran, should be pursued, both to increase Iranian confidence that it will not be attacked again as it was in June, snd to weaken the belief in Iran that a nuclear weapon is necessary to deter attacks against the country.
Second, the U.S. and European countries should explore ways to relax sanctions against Iran quickly and in tandem with progress in implementing the new and slightly revised JCPOA.
Above all, we need to avoid any triumphalism derived from recent attacks on Iran.
We would do well to recall the euphoria many felt after the “shock and awe” of invading Iraq in 2003.
How did that work out?
FURTHER READING
1)Christiane Amanpour, (Interview) ”There is no military solution to this, warns former US Secretary of State John Kerry” Amanpour and Company, CNN Video, June 23, 2025.
Most non-experts in the U.S. are not aware of the many achievements the JCPOA made in restricting Iranian nuclear activities that could lead to the development of a nuclear weapon. This interview with John Kerry throws considerable light on these achievements, and highlights tge self-defeating nature of the U.S. withdrawal from the agreement in 2018.
2)Michael McFaul, “The Implications of Trump's Bombing of Iran for Other US National Security Interests; Few countries in the world supported our preemptive strike against Iran. That's damaging to America's reputation in the world. Maybe Trump does not care. I do,” McFaul’s World, June 24, 2025.
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James Rowles is a former Lecturer on Law at Harvard Law School and professor of international law at other universities.
He studied the history of Nazi Germany at Stanford, and has studied and worked on human rights, judicial reform, and access to justice projects in many countries in Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, and in Afghanistan and Russia. At Harvard Law School, he taught a course on “Law, Human Rights, and the Struggle for Democracy in Latin America”.
At the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) of the OAS, he worked on human rights cases involving forced disappearances, executions, and torture in anumber of authoritarian countries in Latin America and the Caribbean.
Recent Books by the Author
James P. Rowles, The Rape of American Democracy: Republican Actions and Democratic Failures, 2016-2021 (2024). Available on Amazon, and from IngramSpark by clicking on a link here.
James P. Rowles, Don’t Be Stupid. Pay Attention, Damn It! Advice for Undecided Voters and Voters Leaning Toward Trump (2024). Available on Amazon,and from IngramSpark by clicking on a link here.
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